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This paper estimates standard and extended Taylor rules for core countries in the euro
area, namely France, Germany and Italy, as well as for the ECB. Forward, backward
and forecast-based rules are estimated for a variety of samples since the late 1970s. We
are particularly interested in the impact of adding asset prices to the standard Taylor rule
specification. Since forward-looking Taylor rules are usually estimated via GMM we
perform extensive tests for over-identifying restrictions and instrument relevance, a
practice generally eschewed in previous work. We find that asset prices can be highly
relevant as instruments rather than as separate arguments in policy rules. Backward-
looking Taylor rules, however, cannot be rejected outright. Forecast-based rules
perform best using the root mean squared error metric but produce coefficients implying
that central banks may be too aggressive at fighting inflation. Encompassing tests are
therefore required to select the “best” policy rule and these suggest that policy rules
need to have a mix of forward and forecast-based elements. Furthermore too aggressive
reactions to stock prices in particular would have led to an implausible monetary policy.
Hence, asset prices appear at best to serve as indicators of the direction of interest rates
and not as a variable that the ECB directly reacts to.
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We estimate for three euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy) Taylor rules for
samples that yield plausible estimates of the weights for the inflation and output gap
objectives, that is, ones that at least fulfill the so-called “Taylor principle” according to
which a larger than unit nominal interest rate response is required for any unit increase,
especially, in inflation. Hence, for example, a tightening of monetary policy requires a
rise in the real interest rate. We are also interested in whether forward-looking reaction
functions admit a significant reaction to the output gap. Next, we ask what are the
empirical implications of extending the Taylor rule, either by adding some asset price
variable or by using asset prices as an additional instrument. Our aim here is to examine
how well such rules perform under these alternatives. For example, while central banks
routinely admit to considering the role of asset prices in their deliberations (e.g., see
ECB 2001), it is unclear whether this means that they actually respond to such
developments or whether instead movements in such prices more appropriately serve
the function of covariates that can enhance our understanding of interest rate behavior in
the context of a standard Taylor rule.
Briefly, we conclude the following. Evidence consistent with the “Taylor principle”,
that is, a larger than a unit reaction of nominal interest rates to a one percent rise in
inflation, is most apparent when forward-looking or forecast-based reaction functions
are estimated. Furthermore, adding asset prices to the reaction function usually produces
highly volatile interest rate rules, thereby confirming empirically the simulation
evidence of, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999). If, instead, we introduce assets
prices as additional instruments in the GMM estimation phase, estimates become not
only more plausible but result in policy rules that achieve a better fit. In addition, asset
prices as instruments were found to be relevant in statistical terms. We interpret these
results to mean that, whereas the central banks of France, Germany, and Italy did not
directly respond to asset price developments, these did influence expectations of
inflation and the output gap and, hence, indirectly reflected their concern over potential
misalignments in them. Finally, we find that the ECB’s monetary policy is well within
the range of interest rate paths that would be obtained if the central banks in our samplewere still able to set levels for the interest rate instrument. In other words, the ECB does
not appear to have skewed its policies toward any of the major members of the euro
area. Nevertheless, by 2002, according to our estimations ECB monetary policy looks to
be too tight compared to NCB reaction functions, whereas other studies came to the
opposite conclusion. Moreover, it appears that the ECB did not respond to asset price
developments, as these would have produced implausible behavior in interest rates.
Indeed, it would be difficult for the ECB to know which asset price to respond to since,
prior to 1999, housing prices appeared to make a difference in monetary policy
performance in some euro area countries while, in others, either a real exchange rate or




Für drei Euro-Länder (Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien) schätzen wir Taylor-Regeln,
die plausible Schätzungen für die Gewichtung von Inflations- und Produktionslücke
erbringen, das heißt Schätzungen, die zumindest das so genannte „Taylor-Prinzip“
erfüllen, wonach die Reaktion des Nominalzinses auf jede Erhöhung der Inflationsrate
größer als eins sein sollte. Außerdem interessiert es uns, ob Schätzungen für voraus-
schauende Reaktionsfunktionen eine signifikante Reaktion auf die Produktionslücke zu-
lassen. Als nächstes stellen wir die Frage, welche empirischen Folgen es hat, wenn man
die Taylor-Regel   entweder durch Aufnahme einer Vermögenspreisvariable oder die
Verwendung von Vermögenspreisen als ein zusätzliches Instrument  erweitert. Unser
Ziel hier ist es, herauszufinden, wie gut solche Regeln bei Verwendung dieser
Alternativen abschneiden. Zwar geben Zentralbanken in der Regel zu, dass sie die
Vermögenspreise in ihre Überlegungen einbeziehen (siehe z. B. EZB 2001), doch ist
unklar, ob dies bedeutet, dass die Zentralbanken tatsächlich auf Entwicklungen der
Vermögenspreise reagieren oder ob stattdessen Veränderungen dieser Preise eher als
Kovariate dienen, die uns zu einem besseren Verständnis des Verhaltens der Zinssätze
im Kontext einer gewöhnlichen Taylor-Regel verhelfen können.
Wir kommen zu folgender Schlussfolgerung. Am augenfälligsten ist der dem „Taylor-
Prinzip“ entsprechende Befund, d.h. eine Reaktion der Nominalzinssätze auf einen
Inflationsanstieg  über eins, wenn vorausschauende Reaktionsfunktionen geschätzt
werden. Außerdem führt die Einbeziehung von Vermögenspreisen in die
Reaktionsfunktion gewöhnlich zu äußerst volatilen Zinsregeln; dies bestätigt den
Simulationsbefund z. B. von Bernanke und Gertler (1999). Beziehen wir stattdessen
Vermögenspreise als zusätzliche Instrumente in die GMM-Schätzung ein, so werden die
Schätzungen nicht nur plausibler, sondern führen auch zu zinspolitischen Regeln, die
besser mit der tatsächlichen Entwicklung übereinstimmen. Darüber hinaus hat sich
herausgestellt, dass Vermögenspreise als Instrumente auch in statistischer Hinsicht
sinnvoll sind. Wir interpretieren diese Ergebnisse dahingehend, dass, obwohl die
Zentralbanken Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Italiens nicht direkt auf die
Vermögenspreisentwicklung reagierten, deren Entwicklung doch dieInflationserwartungen und Produktionslücke beeinflusste und indirekt Sorgen der
Zentralbanken um dadurch ausgelöste Verzerrungen in diesen Größen widerspiegelt.
Schließlich stellen wir fest, dass sich die Geldpolitik der EZB durchaus innerhalb des
Zinskorridors bewegt, der sich ergeben würde, wenn die in unserer Stichprobe
enthaltenen Zentralbanken noch selbst die Zinsen (entsprechend ihrer früheren Regeln)
festsetzen könnten. In anderen Worten, die EZB scheint bei ihrer Geldpolitik nicht
einseitig eines der größeren Mitgliedsländer des Euro-Währungsgebiets bevorzugt zu
haben. Allerdings erscheint unseren Schätzungen zufolge die Geldpolitik der EZB im
Jahre 2002 als zu restriktiv, gemessen an den früheren nationalen Reaktionsfunktionen,
während andere Unersuchungen zum entgegengesetzten Schluss kamen. Außerdem
zeigt sich, dass die EZB nicht auf Vermögenspreisentwicklungen reagierte, da dies ein
unplausibles Verhalten der Zinssätze erzeugt hätte. Für die EZB wäre es in der Tat
schwierig gewesen zu entscheiden, auf welche Vermögenspreise sie reagieren soll; vor
1999 scheinen in einigen Euro-Ländern die Immobilienpreise einen wichtigen Einfluss
auf die Geldpolitik gehabt zu haben, während in anderen Länder dem realen Wechsel-
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The creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) resulted in a historic transfer of
responsibility in monetary policy from many central banks to a single supra-national
authority. By virtue of its structure, the ECB is a creature of its predecessors’
experiences and so it is of independent interest to ask what its policies look like relative
to ones implemented by the central banks that, prior to 1999, had full responsibility over
the conduct of monetary policy. Despite the existence of an exchange rate mechanism,
the pre-existing central banks shared different economic histories and differences in
emphasis over the principal objectives of monetary policy. Some of these differences
were institutional while others were more policy oriented. Thus, for example, the
Banque de France became autonomous following the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty while the Bundesbank has acted independently of direct government influence.
To be sure, the Maastricht treaty imposed a form of “convergence” in a variety of policy
instruments and indicators. Nevertheless, economic shocks affected prospective euro
area members in a variety of ways (e.g., as with German reunification) and, until the
end of 1998, might have elicited different monetary policy responses. This paper
considers whether this is indeed the case for select countries in the euro area.
Paralleling these developments, the last two decades in Europe and elsewhere has
led to a greater emphasis on inflation control. Whereas inflation performance used to be
interpreted through the behavior of consumer prices alone, more questions are being
asked about whether and how the behavior of asset prices more generally may have
played a role in the conduct of monetary policy.
                                                
*  The research for this paper was partly conducted while Siklos and Bohl were visiting the research
centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Both authors like to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for their
hospitality and financial support, Heinz Herrmann, Rafaela Mousinho Guidi, as well as the participants
of the Bundesbank’s research seminar and the Universidade Católica de Brasilia, for comments on an
earlier draft. Siklos also thanks the SSHRCC for financial support. Earlier versions, under a different
title, were presented at Queensland University of Technology, the Deutsche Bundesbank, and the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank.2
This led us to consider the following issues. First, could central banks have
additional objectives such as a real exchange rate target, or objectives motivated by the
need to maintain financial stability? Second, although it is widely understood that
central banks need to be forward-looking in conducting monetary policy, economists
have had mixed success in generating proxies for forward-looking behavior. Current
best practice typically involves estimating reaction functions using GMM with little or
nor attention paid to how instruments are chosen nor whether they belong in the
estimated relationships. Third, there have relatively few attempts to systematically
estimate reaction functions for member countries within the euro area. While
theoretically more plausible, according to central bankers, forward-looking rules do not
appear to describe monetary policy especially well, as estimates reveal little or no
concern for output performance. Moreover, if we accept a learning-by-doing
perspective, it is by no means clear that backward-looking rules, which can fit the data
relatively better, are implausible. Finally, forward-looking rules rely on proxies for
expectations of key variables. However, central banks and financial markets typically
rely on forecasts. Such forecasts are likely, at least indirectly, to incorporate asset price
developments. Indeed, good conduct in monetary policy has been described as requiring
a forecast-based response (e.g., see Svensson 2003). Consequently, we also provide an
assessment of the relative performance of different types of reaction functions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we estimate for three euro area countries
Taylor rules for samples that yield plausible estimates of the weights for the inflation
and output gap objectives, that is, ones that at least fulfill the so-called “Taylor
principle” according to which a larger than unit nominal interest rate response is
required for any unit increase, especially, in inflation.
1 Hence, for example, a tightening
of monetary policy requires a rise in the real interest rate. We are also interested in
whether forward-looking reaction functions admit a significant reaction to the output
gap. Next, we ask what are the empirical implications of extending the Taylor rule,
either by adding some asset price variable or by using asset prices as an additional
instrument. Our aim here is to examine how well such rules perform under these
alternatives. For example, while central banks routinely admit to considering the role of3
asset prices in their deliberations (e.g., see ECB 2001), it is unclear whether this means
that they actually respond to such developments or whether instead movements in such
prices more appropriately serve the function of covariates that can enhance our
understanding of interest rate behavior in the context of a standard Taylor rule.
Briefly, we conclude the following. Evidence consistent with the “Taylor
principle”, that is, a larger than a unit reaction of nominal interest rates to a one percent
rise in inflation, is most apparent when forward-looking or forecast-based reaction
functions are estimated. Furthermore, adding asset prices to the reaction function
usually produces highly volatile interest rate rules, thereby confirming empirically the
simulation evidence of, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999). If, instead, we
introduce assets prices as additional instruments in the GMM estimation phase,
estimates become not only more plausible but result in policy rules that achieve a better
fit. In addition, asset prices as instruments were found to be relevant in statistical terms.
We interpret these results to mean that, whereas the central banks of France, Germany,
and Italy did not directly respond to asset price developments, these did influence
expectations of inflation and the output gap and, hence, indirectly reflected their
concern over potential misalignments in them. Finally, we find that the ECB’s monetary
policy is well within the range of interest rate paths that would be obtained if the central
banks in our sample were still able to set levels for the interest rate instrument. In other
words, the ECB does not appear to have skewed its policies toward any of the major
members of the euro area. Nevertheless, by 2002, ECB monetary policy looks to be too
tight, whereas other researchers reached the opposite. Moreover, it appears that the ECB
did not respond to asset price developments, as these would have produced implausible
behavior in interest rates. Indeed, it would be difficult for the ECB to know which asset
price to respond to since, prior to 1999, housing prices appeared to make a difference in
monetary policy performance in some euro area countries while, in others, either a real
exchange rate or stock prices were the more relevant asset price indicators.
The following section provides a brief survey about the varieties of Taylor rule.
Next, we describe the estimation and testing strategy of the paper, and how our
                                                                                                                                              
1  Policy rules for smaller euro area members including Austria, Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands
were also examined but, as these did not materially affect the conclusions reported below, they are not
separately discussed.4
estimates might be used to evaluate the stance of monetary policy over time in the
countries considered. A separate section describes the data and presents the empirical








We follow much of the literature by assuming that the central bank minimizes a
loss function of the form:










− + + − ∑ W W L W \ W W
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W     ω ω π π ω δ π (1)
where πt is inflation, 
*
W π  is the inflation target (implicit or explicit, depending on the
institutional arrangement in place),  W  ~  denotes the output gap, δ is a subjective discount
factor, while W is the policy instrument, namely a short-term interest rate (i.e., an
overnight or repo rate). The ω represent the weights on inflation (ωπ), the output gap
( \ ~ ω ), and the degree of interest rate smoothing (ωi). According to (1), the central bank




While tradition, and a considerable amount of empirical evidence, points to
inflation, output, and a desire to minimize interest rate volatility as chief among the
concerns of most central banks (e.g., Favero and Rovelli (2003) but see Rudebusch
(2002) and Lansing (2002)), recent events have prompted some to consider the
possibility that the monetary authority has, or ought to, respond to other variables,
notably asset prices. Theoretically, there is a considerable difference between assuming
that the central bank includes asset prices in its objective function versus assuming that
it treats asset prices as indicators of future inflation and/or the output gap (e.g. see the
debate between Bernanke and Gertler (1999), and Cecchetti et al. (2000)). In the present
paper, we pursue the latter approach since this is consistent with the widely held view
that, while central banks may or may not respond to asset prices, they ought not
explicitly target them.5
Nevertheless, we are left with the problem of asking which asset prices central
banks might be concerned about. In the case of an open economy one might well
envisage the possibility that policy makers are concerned with real exchange rate
movements (e.g., Leitemo (1999), Leitemo and Røisland (1999), and Medina and
Valdés (1999)). Lately, attention has turned to the behavior of stock prices and housing
prices, or some other financial indicator (see below), as central banks are increasingly
seen as responsible for stemming the cycle of booms and busts in asset prices, reflected
in an apparent widening of central bank mandates to include a concern over the
maintenance of financial stability.
Even if it is deemed desirable to incorporate a role for asset prices the investigator
faces a number of difficulties. In particular, there is no widespread agreement on how
best to define an equilibrium real exchange rate (a form of relative purchasing power
parity is the likely candidate), and even less on how to define equilibrium stock or
housing prices, though these problems seem no less intractable than defining the “trend”
in output used in deriving an output gap measure. In the case of stock and possibly
housing prices, the former the subject of a great deal of interest among academics and
policy makers, matters are complicated still further either because there is an element of
“irrational exuberance” that might contain a “bubble” component that is difficult to
measure empirically, or because there is no widespread agreement on how to define
equilibrium conditions in these settings.
Table 1 presents selected estimates of Taylor rules and these tend to be consistent
with the “Taylor principle”. Some are based on estimates of forward-looking reactions
functions; others are of backward-looking variety. Ordinarily, they leave out a role for
asset prices with the notable exception of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who examine
how sotck prices affect interest rate determination in the U.S. and Japan. Cecchetti
(2003) also reports that the Fed reacted to stock market developments relying again on
Taylor rule estimation. There is considerable variation in the estimated weights on the
inflation and output gap objectives, the role of asset prices is not extensively
investigated, nor is the robustness of results or the relative suitability of forward versus
backward-looking or forecast-based models extensively analyzed. Finally, other than for
Germany (e.g., Faust, Rogers and Wright 2001), there is little discussion of what ECB
policy looks like for the euro area in relation to monetary policy in the member6
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$ FL 1.05 0.033 0.026 US 1980-2001
Note: 
1 Coefficients are such that they are constrained to sum to 1; 
2 measure of equity premium risk; 
3
measure of stress in the banking system; 
4 money growth, lagged inflation, fed funds rate, or real euro/$
exchange rate; * simulations; 




An important motivation for estimating a large variety of reaction functions is to
determine how wide was the variation in policy rules behavior select euro area countries
in the lead up to the start of EMU. This necessitates not only considering the extent to
which member states central banks might have been forward looking, but also in








We begin with a standard version of the reduced form version of Taylor’s rule,
written in regression form as:
W W L W \ L W L W     υ ρ γ π γ π + + + + = −1 ~ , ~ ,
~ ~ (2)
where W is the (nominal) interest rate instrument of monetary policy,  [= (1-ρ)α]
is the sum of the steady-state real interest rate and the annual inflation target, π ~ and
 ~are, respectively, the inflation and output gaps, ρ is the interest rate persistence or
smoothing term, and υt is a residual term. If the reaction function is forward looking, the
inflation gap is simply the difference between expected and targeted inflation rates (i.e.,
[Et(πt+n) - π
*]). In a similar fashion, the output gap is the percentage deviation of real
GDP from its potential level. The coefficients  π γ ~  [=(1-ρ)β] and  \ ~ γ  [=(1-ρ)θ] reflect the
weights policy makers place on inflation versus the output gap, while the central
bankers’ preferences for inflation versus output are captured via estimates of β and θ
though these must be “identified” since the economy responds to the same variables.
The coefficients in the reaction function are obtained from an expression that
summarizes the interest rate targeting policy of the central bank, namely:
) ~ ( ) (
*
Q W W Q Q W W Q W     + + + + = θ π β α (3)
where  
￿
W is the interest rate target, Et(πt+n) and Et( W  ~ ) are the conditional
expectations of inflation, -periods ahead (≥), and of the output gap.
2
Since ) ( Q W W  + π  and  ) ~ ( Q W W   +  are unobservable, instruments serve as proxies (see
below). Alternatively, a forward-looking central bank, and one that is able to clearly
communicate its future outlook, might be interpreted as acting on the basis of forecasts
of inflation and output growth. In this case, central bank forecasts or private sector
forecasts such as the ones from Consensus Forecasts, the OECD, 	
, can
serve as proxies. Hence, a version of (2) using forecasted values would be written as:
                                                
2  In (2) the inflation target has been normalized to zero. Equation (1) is then derived from the relation
W W W W    υ ρ ρ + − + = −
*











where most of the variables have been previously defined, and 
I
W L W ,
~
+ π and 
I
W L W  ,
~
+ are,
respectively, forecasts of inflation (or the inflation gap) and the output gap  periods
ahead, conditional on information available at time .
There is some evidence about the desirability of incorporating a mix of forward
backward-looking, or even forecast-based elements. This is partly because Gali and
Gertler (1999) report that a purely forward-looking Phillips curve does not fit the data
well, and Fuhrer’s (1997) finding that there is sufficient inflation persistence to a
warrant incorporating a significant backward-looking component in models of inflation.
A natural way of considering a mix of forward and backward-looking elements, not
heretofore considered, is to ask whether one type of reaction function estimate can
“encompass” another. In this fashion, backward, forward and forecast-based Taylor
rules are tested against each other to determine whether, statistically speaking, it might
be preferable to estimate such rules are linear combinations of each other.
Next, the question arises how to proxy π
*, the inflation target necessary to
evaluate the inflation gap (πt+n - π
*). Usually, π
* is assumed to be a constant (say 2%).
Alternatively, estimates for each of the euro area countries under investigation can be
generated. In this paper we also consider two proxies. First, we tried an HP filter to
estimate the inflation objective.
3 Next, we also assumed that the inflation target is the
mid-point of the spread between the average annual inflation rate in the euro area
countries and the average annual inflation rate in the three lowest inflation rate countries
in the euro area plus 1.5%, as specified in the Maastricht Treaty (article 121, ex article
109j).
4 Since 1988, when the Delors Report was published, if not earlier, European
policy makers discussed the need for European economies’ inflation rates to converge to
                                                
3  Stock and Watson (2003) recommend a one-sided HP filter. In the present paper we also use the
regular HP filter with a standard smoothing parameter (1600) as well as a much larger smoothing
parameter (4800).
4  For the relevant calculations, the euro area is assumed to consist of the original 11 member countries,
namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden.9
some acceptable level prior to the start of monetary union.
5 This assumes that central
banks in the euro area may have regarded the Maastricht requirement as an effective
inflation objective.
6 In practical terms we will assume that inflation in country 
converges by the end of 1998 linearly toward the mid-point of the long-run average
German inflation rate, plus 1.5%, that is when the EU announced the initial membership
in the euro area.
7 Since our conclusions were unaffected by the type of inflation gap
proxy used, we report results which assume a constant inflation objective. This also has
the slight advantage of allowing for a comparison with the bulk of the literature on
Taylor rules.
Similarly, estimation of the output gap has been problematic, especially since
subsequent research has shown that the interpretation of monetary policy actions in an
historical context is very much dependent on whether policy makers at the time based
their decisions on a mis-measurement of the output gap (e.g., see Orphanides (2001) for
the US). As in the case of the inflation gap, we utilize an HP filter as there are relatively
few alternative proxies for the output gap in a cross-section of countries.
8 We also
generate, but do not report here, estimates of the output gap based on a Blachard-Quah
type decomposition with no impact on our conclusions.
Following much of the empirical literature we estimate (2), and its variants, via a
single equation approach, using GMM. Under this procedure, we replace the
unobservable series using lags of actual values of the time series as instruments. In
addition, further adjustments may be made to correct for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity. The chief advantage of GMM is its robustness against a variety of
assumptions about the distribution of the disturbances. Nevertheless, there are a number
                                                
5  As is now well-known, progress toward EMU occurred in three stages: Stage I: July 1990-December
1993, capital market liberalization, ratification of Maastricht (November 1993); Stage II: January
1994-December 1998, ERM I and EMI; Stage III: EMU, January 1999.
6  While this is a reasonable working hypothesis, there remains the problem of translating it into practical
terms for the actual horizon by which time monetary union was in place was far from known with
certainty. Although subsequent “convergence reports” assessed, among other things, inflation
performance in terms of the Maastricht criteria, there were no annual objectives as such, beyond an
expectation of progress toward convergence.
7  Other definitions are possible of course though we show in an appendix (not included but available on
request) that this assumption appears to be a fairly reasonable one by calculating, on an annual basis,
the inflation rate dictated by the Maastricht Treaty, plus 1.5%, and comparing these figures with
German inflation over the same period.10
of drawbacks with the GMM approach, such as the lack of theoretical motivation for the
choice of instruments, some of which can be weak thereby affecting the power of tests,
among other problems that are becoming increasingly apparent (e.g., see Mavroeidis
(2001), Florens, Jondeau, and Le Bihan (2001), and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman
(2002)).
More importantly perhaps, with the exception of Boivin and Giannoni (2002),
there has been no systematic effort to examine the goodness of fit of various reaction
functions and even less concern has been evinced about the relevance of the instruments
used.
9 For example, the -test for goodness of fit is reported without comment.
Nevertheless, focusing on such a test alone also poses problems because one risks
choosing a model with coefficients in the rule that are theoretically implausible. In
addition, while instrumental variable estimation is a powerful tool, it is important to
ascertain how well the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables
appearing here in the policy rule (e.g., the output gap). Shea (1997) points out that
regressing the endogenous variables against the chosen instruments can be misleading
when there are several endogenous variables in the estimated specification. Godfrey
(1999) develops a simple measure for computing instrument relevance. With this in
mind, we use asset prices, among other variables to be discussed below, as instruments
in the GMM phase of estimation and test both their impact on the fit of estimated policy
rules as well as their relevance as instruments.
Our strategy is to obtain estimates of the main parameters of interest, namely,  π γ ~,
\ ~ γ , θ, and β for select euro area members prior to the start of operations of the ECB in
1999. Then, relying on historical estimates, we ask to what extent the behavior of the
euro repo rate since 1999 reflects pre-ECB monetary policy as well as the potential role
of asset prices under the monetary union. An obvious question that arises in this context
is whether it is at all possible to think of euro area members as having an autonomous
                                                                                                                                              
8  Much of the literature uses a two sided HP filter for convenience, or an alternative measure of the
economy’s capacity, but comparable time series are not available for the vast majority of euro area
countries.
9  The authors report a variety of -statistics to determine the horizon used by the policy makers (also see
below). They do not, however, report whether plausible reaction function estimates were obtained for
all the combinations reported. As we shall see, estimates at different horizons do not always produce
plausible coefficients.11
monetary policy over the sample in question.
10 Clearly, institutional devices such as the
EMS, and the Maastricht Treaty, constrained the ability of the prospective members’
central banks to engage in an independent interest rate setting policy. However, during
the period under study concerns were expressed over the interpretation of convergence
requirements for fiscal policy
11 and short-term interest rates, although the Maastricht
Treaty imposed a convergence requirement on long-term interest rates.
Moreover, not only was the EMS subject to numerous realignments but it is
widely agreed that German monetary and economic reunification provided a large
asymmetric shock to the euro area for a time even calling into question whether EMU
would go ahead on time as planned. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2000; also see
Clarida 2001) argue that their specification can be applied essentially in the same
manner for fixed as for floating rate regime countries.
12
Returning to estimation issues, it would seem desirable to make some allowances
for interdependencies in interest rate setting behavior among the central banks in the
euro area. One simple solution is to replace the domestic interest rate with the lagged
German short-term rate. The Bundesbank was the dominant central bank in the euro
areas over the sample prior to the start of EMU. We also consider this possibility.
Once the reaction functions are estimated we can back-out the implied target
interest rates over time (i.e., W
￿) to determine how well reaction function (1) “fits” with
actual interest rate developments in the individual countries considered. As a result, we
can also ask, via encompassing tests, which measure provides the best “fit” overall (also
see Collins and Siklos (2004)). Next, we generate the implied target interest rate if
individual countries in the euro area used a harmonized measure of inflation and output
after 1999, as well as evaluating the path of interest rates after 1999 using coefficient
estimates from each country prior to the start of EMU. This test effectively asks whether
it is possible to detect an interest rate “bias” in the early years of operation of the ECB
by comparing the interest rate path predicted based on each country’s reaction function
against the actual interest rates set by the ECB, or whether there is some sensible linear
                                                
10  This is an aspect of the problem that appears to have been largely downplayed in the literature.
11  Namely, the 3% of GDP deficit rule, and the 60% of GDP public debt rule. These concerns would lead
to the formulation of the Stability Pact.
12 Neiss and Nelson (2001) argue that exchange rate effects are effectively incorporated into models such
as (2) and (3) provided we interpret the shocks in such a model “broadly”.12
combination of reaction function estimates of 
￿ is able to replicate the ECB’s interest
rate policy. Finally, we also consider the potential role for some euro area wide





We now consider whether select euro area central banks can be said to have
reacted to variables other than inflation, the output gap, or lagged interest rates, during
the period in question. A criticism of this strategy is that, to the extent that asset prices
are forward looking indicators of inflation, these may effectively act as a proxy for  W π ~
and  W  ~ . However, as shown convincingly by Stock and Watson (2003), it is not the case
that asset prices can reliably forecast future inflation or output. An extended Taylor rule
might be written as follows:
W W [ W W \ W W     
’
~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ υ γ ρ γ π γ π + + + + + = − (4)
where  W  ~  represents deviations in asset price movements from some equilibrium or
“fundamental” value.
In the empirical work that follows, we have in mind three classes of asset prices,
namely the real exchange rate (ε), stock prices (s), housing prices (h), as well as some
aggregate measure of asset price (a).
13 When the variables enter individually,
equilibrium asset prices are again proxied via an HP filter. Stock prices present
somewhat of a complication owing to theoretical considerations that are used to explain
asset price movements. It is also well known that while housing is an important
component of wealth, markets across countries are rather idiosyncratic in nature (e.g.,
Iacoviello (2000)) with potentially dissimilar effects on individual economies (e.g., see
Iacoviello and Minetti (2000), and Goodhart and Hofmann (2001)). Stock prices have
played an increasingly important role in central bank deliberations, because a rising
share of households own such assets, as well as due to concerns over the implications of
more volatile stock prices.
                                                
13 We also consider the case where a measure of consumption expenditures serves as a potential
instrument for output.13
Some have noted (e.g., Borio and Lowe (2002)) that it is not individual asset
prices as such but some combination of asset prices that central banks ought to consider
reacting to. These combinations come in the form either of a financial conditions index
(e.g., Goodhart and Hofmann (2001), Smets (1997)) or an index that attempts to capture
the changing relative importance of asset prices over time. We then repeat the exercises
conducted using the baseline model, make some comparisons, and draw conclusions.
.*. /
Irrespective of the method or assumed determinants of the estimated reaction
function, we proceed by estimating such functions for three European countries, namely
France, Germany, and Italy.
14 This implies, for example, that in (2) estimates of β, θ,
and ρ are all positive. Moreover, plausible estimates consistent with the Taylor principle
would require a value for β that exceeds one. Under some circumstances, such as
uncertainty about whether the rise in inflation is transitory or not, whether the reaction
function is forward or backward-looking, the price index used, and even the type of
monetary regime in place, an estimate of β<1 may be retained (see below). Otherwise,
all instances where the signs of these coefficients violate the theoretical predictions are
discarded.
15 In the case of extended Taylor rules, we similarly expect that the
coefficients on housing prices, stock prices, aggregate asset prices or the financial
conditions index, to be positive corresponding to 
) V +
~ ~ ~ , , β β β , while the coefficient on
the real exchange rate, namely  ε β ~ , should be negative.
16 The same strategy is applied to
estimates of backward-looking Taylor rules as well as rules based on external forecasts.
The estimation strategy then proceeds as follows. First, we generate a set of
forward, backward and forecast-based Taylor rules that are plausible, that is, ones that
result in the theoretically expected signs.
17 At all times we are careful to examine the
                                                
14 This is done partly to minimize the well-known small sample problems that arise when the GMM
technique is applied.
15 Since we will be considering a very large number of cases this seems like a sensible strategy to
minimize inclusion of borderline cases and prevent relying on reaction functions solely based on some
arbitrarily chosen statistical significance level.
16 Due to the manner in which the IMF defines the real exchange rate, a rise signifies a fall in
competitiveness and vice-versa for a fall in the real exchange rate.
17 We also consider the sensitivity of our estimates to the choice of a smaller sample, namely consisting
of the 1990s only where there is more of a consensus that the central banks in our study were indeed
forward-looking and can be described as setting interest rates in the kind of setting envisioned by14
goodness of fit of our reaction functions by conducting tests for over-identifying
restrictions. An alternative way to examine goodness of fit is to ask how well the
estimated Taylor rules forecast in sample. Consequently, we also report the root mean
squared error (RMSE) for each specification. Simultaneously, we test the validity of the
instruments in our forward-looking specifications. Finally, we attempt to reduce the
number of plausible estimates to a minimum by applying encompassing tests prior to
reporting a comparison of actual ECB interest rate policy relative to a counterfactual
based on the historical performance of Taylor rules in the pre-ECB era.
                                                                                                                                              





All data were either quarterly at the source or converted to the quarterly frequency
by taking monthly averages where necessary. In the case of real GDP, seasonally
unadjusted data were used and adjustment was made using X-11. To generate the output
gap we use the HP filter with smoothing parameters 1600 or 4800. We also
experimented with a one-sided HP filter due to the well-known endpoint problem with
such filters with no discernible impact on our conclusions.
18 Next, we transform all
variables, except the nominal interest rate, into 100 time the fourth order log difference,
that is, WW￿￿, where  is the variable of interest. Aggregate asset prices are
from the BIS. Readers should refer to Borio and Lowe (2002) for details. The financial
conditions index (FCI) is constructed from the weights estimated by Goodhart and
Hofmann (2001) using a reduced form model of the economy. The index then is a linear
combination of changes in interest rates, real exchange rates, house prices, and stock
prices, the latter three variables as deviations from their equilibrium (also evaluated via
HP filtering).
Table 2 presents full sample estimates of forward-looking reaction functions. All
the reaction functions have in common the fact that the weight on the inflation gap is
often, though not always, greater than one (see below), while the weight on the output
gap is positive and often statistically significant. In addition, the -test statistic suggests
that the specifications are admissible. Moreover, and in keeping with much of the rest of
the literature, all reaction functions are based on a one-year ahead (i.e., four quarters
ahead) horizon.
19 Table 2 also shows instances where plausible extended Taylor rule
estimates were obtained.
Examination of forward-looking reaction function estimates in Table 2 yields six
broad conclusions. First, point estimates of the inflation gap are quite sensitive to the
                                                
18 Rennison (2003) reports that the HP filter (though he seems to prefer a version augmented with the
residuals from a reduced form Phillips curve), combined with estimates from a Blanchard-Quah
structural vector autoregression, is the best output gap estimators. He generated data from an artificial
economy and uses a Monte Carlo experiment to determine which from among several estimators of the
output gap are able to mimic the “true” output gap. Turning points and amplitudes of the resulting
output gap data published by the Bank of Canada are very similar to the residuals from HP filtered
data. See Siklos, Werner, and Bohl (2004).
19 Siklos, Werner and Bohl (2004) estimate  reaction functions for a group of inflation and non-inflation
targeting countries, and find that inflation targeting countries are more forward-looking.16
specification of the instruments and to whether a standard or an extended Taylor rule is
estimated. Indeed, if we take the case of Germany, goodness of fit is improves
considerably if housing prices are used as an additional argument. Second, plausible
reaction function estimates, wherein the central bank evinces a concern for the output
gap, are found with weights broadly comparable with others reported in the literature
(see Table 1). Third, the set of plausible reaction function estimates consistent with the
Taylor principle can just as easily be found where asset prices serve as an additional
instrument as when such variables appear as separate argument in the Taylor rule.
Nevertheless, when we test for instrument relevance we are able to conclude that
standard Taylor rules with asset prices as additional instruments produce adequate
specifications. For example, housing prices are highly correlated with the output gap for
Germany and France and with inflation for Italy. However, asset prices are largely
orthogonal to innovations in the policy rule, with the exception of Italy, where either
stock returns, housing prices, or the aggregate asset price index appear to belong as
additional arguments in the Taylor rule.
Adding some asset price to a standard Taylor rule tends to reduce the weight on
the inflation variable although, other than for France, the Taylor principle is not
violated. However, if we test whether the of the coefficients on the inflation and
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Notes: Standard refers to the Taylor rule as in (1). Extended refers to the extended Taylor rule as in (4). π ~ is the
inflation gap where all estimates shown assume a constant value (normalized to zero). The results are shown only for
those cases where plausible estimates for the coefficients in the various Taylor rules were obtained. The “filter” refers
to the smoothing parameter λ used in the H-P filtering of the series in question (16 signifies that λ=1600; 48 means
that λ=4800 in which case a “hp4800” is added). The extended rules add the relevant financial asset in the rule itself,
otherwise financial assets may enter as additional instruments used in testing the over-identifying restrictions. These
asset prices are shown in the brackets and are also defined in the text but see also below. J is the p-value for the test
of over identifying restrictions. R
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OLS ) where 	 is the standard error estimates for the coefficients on the endogenous
variables, and RSD is the residual standard deviations for the regressions estimated either via OLS or GMM. Data
used are quarterly. The financial assets represented are  ~ (aggregate asset price index), 
~
 (housing prices),   ~ (stock
prices). Additional instruments include 
 ~ (consumption spending), ε ~ (real exchange rate), lagged US interest rates
(86), lagged interest rates (), the rate of change in oil prices (), the lagged output gap (  ~ ), and a constant (
).
Four lags for all instruments were used. Samples are given in Table 2. Estimates use GMM with 4 lags for each
instrument, a Bartlett kernel, Newey-West bandwidth, and HAC weighting matrix. RMSE = root mean squared
errors.18
based on a Wald test.
20 A good example is the extended Taylor rule for Germany
augmented with housing prices (case 6), or France with the BIS’s measure of aggregate
asset prices added (case 2). Hence, the reaction to a more general set of “prices” also
produces results consistent with the Taylor principle. Fifth, we find that while interest
rate smoothing is an important feature in all reaction function estimates, as proxied by
the lagged interest rate variable, there appear to be substantial cross-country differences.
In addition, estimates of ρ can be sensitive to the specification in question. For example,
in the case of Germany, the degree of interest rate smoothing drops substantially if
housing prices represent a separate argument in the reaction function. In the case of
Italy, there appears to be somewhat more interest rate persistence when either housing
or stocks enter an extended Taylor rule. Finally, it is notable that if we evaluate the root
mean squared errors (RMSE) based on the differences between actual and the implied
interest rate target based on the various estimated rules, the best outcome is when an
asset price is added to the Taylor rule.
In general then, a statistical approach to estimating forward-looking reaction
functions would result in choosing a standard Taylor rule possibly with housing prices
as an additional instrument to the usual list of lags in inflation, the output gap, and the
nominal interest rate. While other estimates seem equally valid, the preferred ones have
the advantage of retaining Taylor’s original rule while using the same type of asset price
for a cross-section of countries.
Next, we briefly describe some extensions to the results shown in Table 2
considered but not shown here. For example, we considered the possibility that central
banks react differently to positive versus negative changes in inflation.
21 We find that
the null of  0 = − + + β β , that is, that the reaction to the sum of positive and negative
inflation changes cannot be rejected for France and Germany while, in the case of Italy,
the results are mixed. The bottom line is that there is no evidence that central banks
                                                
20  In the case where the real exchange rate gap appears in the extended Taylor rule, the absolute value of
the coefficient is used owing to the manner in which the real exchange rate series is defined, as
explained above.
21 We also considered a separate possibility, namely that reactions to the output gap might also be
asymmetric. However, owing to the uncertainty surrounding the measurement of this variable we opted
to focus on inflation which is both more easily measured and the subject of debate among those who
view some central banks as displaying a bias toward tight monetary policies, especially during the
1990s.19
examined here are more likely to tighten than other central banks in our sample.
22
Replacing the lagged domestic interest rate with the lagged German rate leaves most of
the reaction function estimates unchanged. Finally, we also re-estimated all the reaction
functions by replacing the HP filtered output gap measure with a measure derived from
applying a Blanchard-Quah decomposition.
23 The resulting reaction functions are
broadly similar to the ones shown in Table 2 although the range of coefficients on the
output gap is somewhat greater when an SVAR is used to generate the output gap. In
addition, the p-values for the test of over-identifying restrictions are also generally
higher than in the case where the HP filter is employed.
Next, we turn our attention to estimates of backward-looking Taylor rules. These
are shown in Table 3. Again, we retain only those Taylor rules which appear plausible
(i.e., have the correct signs). It is quite apparent, however, that such an approach results
in central banks potentially “under”-reacting to inflation and “over”-reacting to the
output gap. Only estimates from Italy produce coefficients on inflation that are roughly
consistent with the “Taylor principle”. Also notable is that the coefficients on the output
gap are considerably larger than was found for the forward-looking models. When the
lagged German interest rate is used in place of the domestic interest rate (not shown),
reactions functions for France are now consistent with the Taylor principle.
                                                
22 Since the sample extends back into the 1980s the result is not unduly influenced by the disinflation
since the 1990s nor by the Maastricht convergence requirements. Indeed, when the “threshold” for
positive versus negative gaps is defined by the inflation rate consistent with the Maastricht Treaty, we
find significantly higher interest rate responses to positive inflation gaps for Italy and France. For
Germany the results are mixed although the size of the bias is quantitatively small.
23 The relevant output gaps were obtained by estimating a VAR of order 8 consisting of the log of real
GDP and inflation, with an exogenous deterministic trend.  The estimated output gap is then the sum of
demand shocks, that is, the level of output due to the accumulated temporary shocks. The restriction
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Note: See Notes to Table 2 for explanation of symbols and models. Estimation using Ordinary Least
Squares.
There is also no evidence of asymmetric reactions to inflation shocks for France,
and Italy while the net effect is negative for Germany (not shown). These results are
broadly consistent with those found when forward-looking models are estimated. The
same is generally true when the Blanchard-Quah decomposition is used to generate the
output gap (results not shown). Indeed, the reaction functions begin to look more like
the ones shown in Table 2. Finally, few, if any of the backward-looking estimates
display any statistically significant reactions to asset prices, other than Banque de
France’s reaction to housing prices. Note also that, with the exception of Germany and
Italy, the lowest RMSE is achieved when an asset price is added to the standard Taylor
rule.
Comparing the RMSE for forward and backward-looking reaction functions, it is
not clear whether one type is clearly preferred over the other, at least in purely empirical
terms. In order to shed more light on this issue, we next perform encompassing tests of
the kind suggested by Chong and Hendry (1986). Based on these, one cannot reject the
null that actual interest rate movements represent a linear combination of forward and
backward looking behavior in 2 of the three countries considered (Germany and Italy)
while the backward looking estimates encompass the forward looking ones for France.21
While Tables 2 and 3 provide reaction function estimates that are in varying
degrees based on the past history of the time series of interest, Table 4 considers actual
forecasts of inflation and the real GDP growth.
24 Once again we limit the discussion to
plausible reaction function estimates and consider three different forecasts. These are:
forecasts of inflation and the output gap from the OECD (OECD Main Economic
Outlook,   	), forecasts of inflation and real GDP growth from 	

 (Poll of Forecasters,  	; see Siklos (2002) for details), and
inflation and real GDP growth forecasts from 	 


(www.consensuseconomics.com) Estimates rely on OLS where the current nominal
interest rate is regressed on the inflation and output forecasts for the current quarter (at
annual rates) made in the previous year (hence the label   in the Table). In the case of
the OECD forecasts, as these are semi-annual, the raw data were converted to the
quarterly frequency through interpolation while the forecasts from 	 
,
available monthly, were converted to quarterly through simple averaging.
Unfortunately, we do not have forecasts for the asset price variables considered earlier.
However, to the extent these forecasts reflect anticipated asset price developments, a
distinct possibility, the resulting estimates indirectly tell us something about the
indicator role of asset prices.
25
The results are striking for they suggest that if central banks reacted to these
forecasts believe they would, in effect, have reacted very strongly to expectations of
rising inflation, more so than any of the alternative estimates presented so far.
Moreover, save the case of the lone inflation targeting country in our data set, central
banks are still seen as reacting to output. Nevertheless, the impression is that forecast
based reaction functions interpret the central bank in question as being far more
aggressive than either the backward or forward-looking estimated Taylor rules shown
here, in some cases approaching the “inflation nutter” type of central bank in the sense
of King (1997).
26 Also striking is the fact that the forecast-based reaction functions
                                                
24 Other than the OECD all other forecasts are for the rate of change in real GDP growth. We detrended
these to obtain a proxy for the output gap.
25  Obviously, we do not know the nature of the forecasting models in question. However, it is interesting
to note that current quarter forecasts regressed on lagged asset prices produce highly significant
regression results (not shown).
26 The inflation “nutter” places an excessively large emphasis on inflation fighting and no concern for
output. No plausible reaction function could be estimated if the forecast-based rule used two or more
years ahead forecasts to generate a policy rule (not shown).22
track interest rates better in many cases than either the forward or backward-looking
varieties shown in Tables 2 and 3. Nevertheless, when the encompassing tests (not
shown) are extended to include forecast-based estimates, these are never encompassed
by either forward or backward looking models.
27
Finally, we turn our attention to the issue of the stance of monetary policy in the
euro area. Since the ECB took responsibility for monetary policy in 1999 member
countries in the euro area can no longer respond to own inflation or output gap shocks.
Since it is too soon to estimate a euro area reaction function for a sample beginning in
1999, we instead perform a counterfactual experiment by asking what might interest
rates have been if the ECB’s response ranged from the most responsive to the least
responsive member of the euro area based on estimates that prevailed until the end of
1998.
28 The results are shown in Figures 1A and 1B. Both Figures plot the ECB’s
instrument of monetary policy, the repo rate, and the hypothetical interest rate path that
would have prevailed if we relied instead on the range of inflation and output gap
coefficients based on the variety of coefficient estimates in Table 2.
29 For the purposes
of this experiment we assume that the ECB is forward-looking.
The results suggest that if the ECB reacted in the most aggressive fashion possible
to inflation and the output gap (i.e., Max INF + GAP), based on historical estimates,
interest rates would have been considerably higher and more volatile than the actual
ECB’s repo rate, at least until 2002. If, instead, we posited a euro area wide reaction
function that permits an aggressive reaction either to stock prices (SP) or the BIS’s
measure of aggregate asset prices (AP), along with inflation and the output gap of
course, interest rates in the euro would have become negative by 2001.
30 Since this is
clearly an implausible result one can conclude that an aggressive response to asset
prices in the euro area would have been excessive while a modest response to these
                                                
27 The results of these encompassing tests cannot be directly compared to the same tests reported earlier
because the sample size is shorter due to data constraints for forecast data. For Germany and Italy
forward and forecast based rules encompass backward-looking rules. For France, backward and
forecast based rules encompass forward-looking rules.
28 Euroarea-wide data prior to 1999 re available though it is unclear under the circumstances how useful
they are since the transfer of responsibility over monetary policy clearly represents a regime change.
29 Figures 1 rely on standard Taylor rules. Using some of the estimated extended rules did not change the
conclusions from this exercise and are, hence, omitted here.
30 Euro area wide measures of inflation and real GDP were provided by the BIS. Euro area wide
measures of stock returns and asset prices were generated as a weighted average of individual euro
area member countries’ estimates. See Siklos, Werner and Bohl (2004) for additional details.23
same asset prices would have resulted in a looser monetary policy than the ECB
actually implemented. More generally, the evidence suggests that it would have been
difficult for the ECB to know which asset price to rely on since, prior to 1999, it is
conceivable that different asset prices mattered to each of the then autonomous central
banks.
However, it is notable that by 2002, ECB policy is too tight regardless of the
representative coefficients used to generate the counterfactuals. This provides a little bit
of evidence to support critics of ECB policy, especially from 2002 on. Our results, at
least for the most recent observations, stand in contrast with those reported by Faust,
Rogers and Wright (2001), and Clausen and Hayo (2002), both of whom reported that
the ECB’s monetary policy stance was looser relative to the one that would have been
implemented by, say, a still independent Bundesbank.
4* 
This paper has considered the estimation of both standard and extended Taylor
rules for select euro area countries. The latter incorporate asset prices in order to
determine whether central banks may have been reacting to developments in the
financial sector. Alternatively, we considered the possibility that asset prices may have
served as forward-looking variables that played a role as instruments in estimates of
forward-looking reaction functions. Based on priors of what constitutes “best practice”
in the conduct of monetary policy, we find that forward-looking models describe central
bank behavior quite well since the early 1980s and represent an even better description
of their reaction to inflation and output since the beginning of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, in all such cases, more plausible estimates require the inclusion of
asset prices as instruments in GMM estimates of forward-looking reaction functions.
Turning to backward-looking estimates these cannot be rejected out of hand though they
produce coefficient estimates that are not entirely consistent with the conduct of a
successful monetary policy, as stipulated by Taylor. Finally, forecast-based reaction
functions pre-suppose that monetary authorities are more aggressive than might be
expected though the resulting reaction functions are generally superior to either forward
or backward-looking versions, at least based on the RMSE criterion.24
While the finding that asset prices are useful indicators in the conduct of monetary
policy the ECB does face a potential difficulty since in the pre-ECB era, the asset price
that appears to have been best suited to explaining interest rate movements varied across
the countries examined. Although housing prices would be an acceptable candidate for
such an indicator, the data are unavailable for the euro area. By contrast, using either a
measure of aggregate prices or stock prices yields implausible estimates, at least based
on the performance of the central banks prior to devolving their authority to the ECB.
This is certainly an indication of additional difficulties faced by the fledgling central
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(  π , ~ 3.67 (1.38)* 2.67 (2.42) .88 (0.09)* -2.67 (3.49)
2.93
2 [90-99], hp4800
2  π , ~ 0.38 (0.35) 2.00 (0.06)* .92 (0.04)* 6.63 (2.61)* 4.08
3 [90-99], hp1600
&  π , ~ 4.21 (0.73)* 1.58 (1.71) .76 (0.10)* -3.58 (1.86)* 1.14
4 [90-99], hp4800




2  π , ~ 0.00 (0.47) 1.91 (0.71)* .89 (0.04)* 6.73 (1.82)*
3.59
6 [90-98], hp1600
&  π , ~




(  π , ~ 2.00 (0.29)* 0.15 (0.80) .67 (0.12)* 0.39 (1.35) 1.83
8 [90-99], hp4800
2  π , ~ 0.67 (0.19)* 1.58 (0.63)* .88 (0.03)* 6.83 (2.07)* 5.19
9 [90-99], hp1600
&  π , ~ 2.20 (0.40)* 3.15 (2.51) .80 (0.10)* -0.25 (1.62) 1.83
10 [90-99], hp4800
&  π , ~ 2.55 (0.39)* 1.41 (1.93) .78 (0.10)* -0.59 (1.46) 1.36
Notes: See Notes to Table 2 for explanation of symbols and models. Samples reflect data availability.
Forecasts in question made at time   for time . Sources of forecasts are: Consensus forecasts (C). Data
are quarterly; semi-annual data from the OECD (O) were converted to quarterly via interpolation; data are
monthly for 	
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Notes: The top figure shows the actual euro area repo rate (ECB repo rate) and the repo rate under two counterfactual exercises: for
Max INF + GAP we generate estimates from   W
~ 94 . 2 2 59 . 4 + + = π
 which corresponds to the largest values for the response
to inflation and the output gap that was obtained (Austria). Here inflation and the output gap are for the euro area; in the case of Min
INF + GAP the expression becomes   W
~ 0 29 . 0 0 + + = π
again corresponding to the smallest coefficients obtained (Germany).
In Figure 1B, we apply the same principle now adding an asset price variable (either     ~ ~
) with the coefficients ranging from
0.07 (Min) to 0.57 (Max), again using euro area wide measures for these variables. As available data for AP end in 2001 for AP and
mid 2002 for SP we cannot extend the counterfactual estimates to the end of 2002.3031
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